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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : No. 940379CA 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, : Civil No. 934390096 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category 15 
ooooo 
Comes now the Appellee to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "Wife"), by and through counsel, and hereby submits 
the following as her brief of Appellee herein: 
JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Husband has appealed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce made and entered by the Third Judicial 
District Court for the County of Tooele, State of Utah, the 
Honorable William A. Thorne, Judge, presiding. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1953, as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from 
the final Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of that Decree 
of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Tooele County, State of Utah, and, in particular those provisions 
which awarded the Wife certain interests in real estate holdings 
and which awarded alimony to Wife, and, including, the level of 
alimony. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES, ETC, 
There is no case law authority, nor statutory authority 
believed by Wife to be wholly dispositive or wholly determinative 
of the issues raised on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of 
discretion standard. In divorce proceedings, the appellate court 
will "afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to 
a presumption of validity. ' " Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 542 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) and Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). Therefore, M[t]he trial court's findings of fact 
are presumed to be correct". Baker, at 542. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals has stated that "we view 'the evidence and all the 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most 
supportive of the trial court's findings.'" Baker, at 543 (citing 
Gillmore v. Gillmore, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984)). Further, 
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" [f ] indings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Regarding the property division at issue, the appellate court 
"will alter the trial court's property division 'only if there was 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Baker, at 
543 (citing Watson, 837 P.2d at 5 and Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146) . 
Accordingly, appellant must show that the findings of the trial 
court "are 'so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight 
of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.'" Baker, at 543 
(citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(citations omitted); accord Watson, 837 P.2d at 6. 
Finally, with regard to alimony, this Court has stated that it 
"will not overturn a trial court's alimony ruling as long as the 
court supports its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its 
discretion according to the standards we have set." Willey v. 
Willey, 866 P. 2d 547, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Additionally, "the 
trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions will not be 
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overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Schindler 
v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This divorce action was tried before the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, on January 
20, 1994, The Honorable Judge William A. Thorne, presiding. The 
judge, among other things, entered orders regarding the disposition 
of the marital estate and award of alimony to Wife. 
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law from which the Husband appeals, were signed and entered by the 
court on March 8, 1994. Said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto, designated as 
Appendix "A" and Appendix "B," respectively. 
Husband moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, for an 
Amendment to the Decree of Divorce. Subsequent to hearing, the 
trial court denied this motion by an order entered May 17, 1994. S 
Said order is attached hereto, designated as Appendix "C." 
Husband then moved for an extension of time within which to 
file a Notice of Appeal and filed his notice on June 28, 1994. 
Husband has appealed the trial court's award of alimony and 
division and distribution and characterization of the real property 
of the parties. Husband's brief was filed with the Court of 
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Appeals on November 23, 1994. Wife moved for an extension of time 
within which to file her brief, which was granted by the Court on 
December 22, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on September 10, 1978, in Elko, 
Nevada. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, %2, Index 253). 
The parties resided together continuously as husband and wife, but 
for a brief period of separation in May, 1991. (Tr., p.7, 11. 15-
25, p.8, 11.1-17.) The parties were married for sixteen years. 
Wife was born June 9, 1932, and was 61 years of age at the 
date of trial. (Tr. , p. 6, 11. 17-19.) Wife obtained a high school 
diploma in 1949 and later took a class at a junior college in San 
Antonio and some courses at Brigham Young University. (Tr., p.154, 
11. 6-9.) While Wife had worked prior to her marriage, she did not 
work subsequent to the marriage. (Tr., p.155, 11. 1-7.) 
Subsequent to the parties' separation, however, Wife worked part-
time for her sister-in-law making quilts with a quilting machine 
acquired by the parties during the marriage. (Tr., p.155, 11. 9-
25.) Wife's average monthly income from the quilting business was 
approximately $300.00. (Tr., p.157, 11. 5-9.) 
Wife testified at trial that she believed that when she turned 
62, she would be entitled to social security which she believed 
would be approximately $348.00. (Tr., p.159, 11. 2-3.) Plaintiff's 
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monthly expenses were found to be $879.00 per month, excluding any 
mortgage or rent payment (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf 
Ul9f Index 245.) 
Husband was employed by Kennecott Copper Corporation during 
the marriage and until his retirement in 1985, at which time he 
took an early retirement. (Tr. , p. 156, 11. 16-20) . The Husband had 
a total net income, including social security and Kennecott 
retirement of $1,200.00 per month, less the deduction for the 
survivor benefit which he paid each month for the benefit of Wife. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^19, Index 246.) The 
survivor benefit paid each month was $44.21. (Tr., p.216, 11. 2-
12.) At the date of trial, husband was 65 years of age, having 
been born October 15, 1928. (Tr., p.222, 11. 24-25, p.223, 1.1.) 
Husband had worked for Kennecott Copper Corporation for 25 (twenty-
five) years and two (2) months, retiring on July 1, 1985. (Tr., 
p.223, 11.2-5. ) 
While the parties were married during a period of seven years 
in which retirement accrued, the court found that, based upon the 
award of alimony, Defendant Knowlden should be awarded all right, 
title and interest in his Kennecott retirement. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 124, Index 244.) 
At trial, Husband testified that the quilting machine, 
previously utilized by Wife during the period of separation to 
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supplement her income, was purchased with pre-marital funds in 
March of 1993. (Tr., p.242, 11. 17-21.) Husband testified he 
wanted the machine awarded to him. (Tr., p.243, 11. 1-3.) Further, 
the Husband testified that he purchased the quilting machine and 
two bolts of material for $6,500.00 at that time and when asked if 
he intended to use the quilting machine stated "Well it looks like 
I'm going to have to have income from some source. I am too old to 
be employed by, who's going to hire a 65-year old man?" (Tr., 
p.244, 11. 7-11.) The quilting machine was awarded to Husband and 
the trial court found that Husband had an ability to earn an 
additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he was being awarded 
the quilting machine, which he had requested. This finding was 
based upon the fact that Wife had testified that she could earn 
$300.00 per month from the use of that machine and had been earning 
that sum during the pendency of the action. The court found that 
Wife would no longer have that money available to her, but Husband 
would have the money available to him to add to his monthly net 
income. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 246.) 
During trial, Wife testified that she was willing to give the 
quilting machine to Husband if he wanted to pay her alimony 
instead. (Tr., p.162, 11. 5-8.) 
The court ultimately awarded Wife $400.00 per month, as and 
for alimony. The court analyzed the parties' respective incomes 
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and found that Husband would have has $1,200.00 net income per 
month from retirement and social security and $300.00 per month 
from quilting income, for a total of $1,500.00 per month. Wife was 
awarded a note receivable generating $120.00 per month, and a 
rental property generating $325.00 per month for a total of $445.00 
per month. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, fl9, Index 
245, 255.) 
Prior to and during the course of the marriage, the parties 
acquired three parcels of real property. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 1l5, Index 248.) The divorce trial was 
bifurcated, as Husband's sister, Grace Poloskey, was a co-
defendant, and the trial court first addressed the issue of the 
Husband's transfer of a parcel of property referred to as the 
"Grantsville property," from Husband to his sister, Grace Poloskey, 
and whether that constituted a fraudulent transfer. (Tr.. p.5, 11. 
1-8.) The court found that the "Grantsville property," known as 
6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, was acquired by the Husband prior 
to the marriage, that he paid $2,500.00 for the land in, 
approximately, 1956, and that the land remained undeveloped until 
the parties commenced building upon the property. Further, the 
court found that the Husband and Wife commenced building a 
residence on that property in 1981, and, by their labor and "sweat 
equity," built the residence, which fair market value at the time 
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of trial was assessed at $86,000.00. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, ^ [6, Index 252-253.) The court also found that 
on May 13, 1991, Husband transferred that property to his sister, 
Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration and, based upon a number 
of considerations and findings, found that the property had been 
fraudulently conveyed by Husband to his sister and that, indeed, it 
was marital property for purposes of disposition at the date of 
trial. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^[6-11, Index 
250-253.) 
At trial, the Wife testified that in June of 1979, the parties 
assisted in tearing down a 9,000 foot commissary building at Hill 
Air Force Base to get lumber to build their home with. They did 
that from June through October, working practically every day, 
including Sundays. Wife testified that she would drive a two-ton 
truck and haul materials and help gather materials daily. She 
testified regarding the fact that the parties went to several 
auctions and tore down several buildings to use for materials for 
the home. (Tr. , p.11, 11. 1-11.) Wife testified that the 
foundation of the home was put in place in 1982 and that the 
parties continued to work every day on the home and jointly until 
1985 when the home was complete enough to move into and when 
Husband had retired. (Tr., p.11, 11. 11-14.) Specifically, Wife 
testified that she had "worked right along beside him in everything 
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we did. And I might not have had the expertise or the strength to 
do as much as he did, but I was sure just as tired and dirty at the 
end of the day as he was." (Tr., p.11, 11. 15-18.) 
Husband had testified that in addition to the original 
$2,500.00 used to purchase the Grantsville lot, that he had used 
retirement monies from Kennecott and sick leave and vacation pay to 
assist in the building of the foundation and some of the other 
construction. (Tr., p.227-228, 11. 21-25, 11. 1-24.) However, 
Husband provided no evidence or testimony as to which portion of 
those funds were pre-marital and which portions had accrued during 
the parties' marriage. 
The trial court specifically found that the funds of money 
that the Husband claimed as pre-marital and which were used to 
assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence, became co-
mingled with marital funds and that any monies that may have been 
separate property had lost their separate identity because of the 
co-mingling. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^6, Index 
252.) Further, the court found, separately, that the residence was 
constructed with the individual efforts and "sweat equity" of 
Husband and Wife and, specifically, that the property had been 
enhanced and augmented by the acts of Wife and found that its 
entire value was a marital asset. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 16, Index. 252.) 
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In addition to the "Grantsville property," the court found 
that the parties resided together during the marriage at a home at 
4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah (the "Reams" property) . It was 
acknowledged that the property was purchased by Husband prior to 
the marriage and in, approximately, 1973, but transferred into the 
names of both parties immediately subsequent to the marriage. The 
court found that the transfer of the property into both parties' 
names constituted a gift. As a separate finding and basis for 
including it as a marital asset, however, the court found that the 
parties resided in the residence, made payments of the mortgage, 
made improvements to the property and that there was such a co-
mingling of the pre-marital asset with marital funds that it was no 
longer pre-marital. The value of that property, at the date of 
trial, was found to be $42,000.00, based upon the appraisal and 
stipulation of the parties. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 1[12, Index 250. ) 
Finally, the third property at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the "Louise" property), was found to 
have been acquired by the Husband in 1976 and titled in his name 
during the marriage. During the marriage, however, the mortgage 
obligation on that residence was paid. Further, the court found 
that there were substantial improvements to the property, including 
siding, new carpeting, thermal windows, and a new roof. Further, 
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the court found that Wife assisted in scraping and repainting the 
property, cleaning the property for the rentals, making curtains 
and managing the property for rentals. The court specifically 
found that it was a marital asset for purposes of assessing the 
marital estate and dividing the same, due to the acquisition of 
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and 
enhancement of the property by Wife during the marriage and, on a 
separate basis, because of the co-mingling of the marital funds. 
That property was valued at $30,000.00. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lawf <|13, Index 249.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's property division in the instant case is 
equitable and fair. There was no misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law; neither was there a clear abuse of the 
court's discretion. Given the facts and circumstances of this 
case, including the contribution of Wife to the enhancement and 
augmentation of the properties in question and, given the age of 
Wife and prospects for future income or employment, the 
characterization of the marital estate and division thereof was 
just. Wife contributed extensively to the maintenance and 
improvements of the properties and their value was enhanced due to 
the efforts of both Husband and Wife. Further, there was 
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substantial co-mingling and any pre-marital monies were 
unidentifiable given the co-mingling. 
The trial court's rulings and findings are adequate and the 
award of alimony is fair and equitable and not an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court. Wife's sole sources of 
income are based on the trial court's property division and alimony 
award and are essential to maintain Wife's ability to provide for 
herself. The court's imputation of $300.00 of income to Husband 
was appropriate and supported by the testimony of both Wife and 
Husband. The alimony award is equitable and should be upheld. 
Wife should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal. Given the clear weight of the evidence preponderating in 
favor of Wife, and given the needs of Wife and abilities of 
Husband, it is fair and equitable that this Court award Wife her 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTER OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The trial court valued the marital estate at approximately 
$162,107.00 and outlined assets as follows: 
PROPERTY/ASSET VALUE 
Grantsville property $86,000.00 
Kearns property $42,000.00 
Louise property $30,000.00 
Chevrolet Celebrity $1,325.00 
Ford truck $800.00 
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Ford mustang $200.00 
Oldsmobile Firenza $975.00 
Chevrolet Citation $100.00 
Chevrolet Cavalier $100.00 
Marcus Knowlden note receivable $7,576.00 
Farm equipment $1,000.00 
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account, 
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah 
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre $1,224.00 
Power Tools and tools $3,500.00 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^15, Index 248.) 
Husband has challenged the inclusion of the Marcus Knowlden 
note receivable as a marital asset. However, the argument that the 
note should be excluded from the estate is wholly contrary to the 
evidence adduced at trial and by Husband. Husband testified that 
in 1978 he assigned a $10,000.00 promissory note to Wife. (Tr. , 
p. 243, 11. 16-18.) The money from that note was paid during the 
marriage and continued to be paid, at the date of trial, at the 
rate of $120.00 per month. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 1J19, Index 246.) Further, Husband testified that Wife should 
keep that note. (Tr. , pp. 247-248, 1. 25 and 11. 1-7.) It was 
clearly transferred into the name of Wife, and appropriately 
included as a marital asset for ultimate distribution between both 
parties. 
As part of the equalization of the division of the estate, the 
court ordered Husband to pay a substantial portion of the marital 
debt. The court found that, in addition to the mortgage debt on 
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the "Louise" property, the debts that existed were as contained on 
Wife's Exhibit 8 and were listed as follows: 
Levitz $ 546.00 
Bank One 437.00 
Property taxes (Kearns) 297.00 
Fire insurance (Kearns) 179.00 
Utah State taxes 103.00 
Debt to Shelly Eyre 113.00 
Total $1,693.00 
The sum was offset against the marital estate and in the 
equalization of the same. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 1|16, Index 247.) In analyzing the distribution of the assets 
and debts, the court was specific and assigned specific values to 
each. In 11l5, 16 and 17 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (Index 247), the properties and debts were distributed as 
follows: 
PROPERTY/ASSET/(DEBT) HUSBAND WIFE 
Grantsville property $86,000.00 
Kearns property 42,000.00 
Louise property * 26,914.00 
Chevrolet Celebrity 1,325.00 
Ford truck 800.00 
Ford mustang 200.00 
Oldsmobile Firenza 975.00 
Chevrolet Citation 100.00 
Chevrolet Cavalier 100.00 
Marcus Knowlden note receivable 7,576.00 
Farm equipment 1,000.00 
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account, 
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah 
Credit Union and the debt owed 
by Ms. Eyre 1,224.00 
Power Tools and tools 3,500.00 
Levitz (546.00) 
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Bank One (437.00) 
Property taxes (Kearns) (297.00) 
Fire insurance (Kearns) (179.00) 
Utah State taxes (103.00) 
Debt to Shelly Eyre (113.00) 
Second mortgage (Louise) (8,245.00) 
TOTALS $ 82,905.00 $ 78,889.00 
(one-half of estate equals $81,000.00) 
*Louise property, $30,000.00, less first mortgage of $3,086.00 
equals net 26,914.00. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf 11)15, 16 & 17, Index 
247) . 
Therefore, while striving to equalize the marital estate, the 
Husband, in receiving the Grantsville property and other property 
assigned to him and paying the debts assigned, received more than 
one-half of the marital estate. As indicated above, the properties 
awarded to him, totaled $82,887.00. Husband received over 
$4,000.00 more of the marital estate than did Wife. His payment of 
the debts, including the debts associated with the Kearns property, 
which included taxes and insurance, was not inconsistent, 
particularly given the temporary nature of the Order on Order to 
Show Cause, which was entered by Judge Brian prior to the trial. 
The temporary order did not prohibit the court from adjusting the 
assets and debts to equalize the marital estate. Further, there is 
nothing in the record that indicates any objection or challenge on 
the part of Husband or his counsel at trial to wife's inclusion of 
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the insurance and property tax debts as marital debts. It was not 
until the motion for retrial that the issue was raised by Husband, 
through counsel. (Tr., p.308, 11. 5-13.) However, given the fact 
that those two debts total $282.00 and Husband received $4,000.00 
more of the marital estate, it is certainly within the equitable 
discretionary powers of the court to make that distribution. See 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1990), Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n dividing the 
marital estate, the trial court may make such orders concerning 
property distribution and alimony as are equitable." Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5(1) (1984 8c Supp. 1987)) (holding that wife's inheritance 
being awarded as her sole property was proper) . 
Wife has no means of income other than the property awarded to 
her and the alimony awarded to her at the time of trial. 
Therefore, the order that Husband pay the minimal debts, and 
readjusting of the same subsequent to a temporary order, is 
appropriate. 
Husband has argued that the court's award of the "Grantsville 
property" to him and the award of the "Louise" and "Kearns" 
properties to Wife is unfair and inequitable, and that he should 
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have been given pre-marital credit on two of the properties as 
follows: 
Grantsville property $9,500.00 
(down payment of $2,500.00, 
increasing in value to 9,500.00 
at the date of appraisal) 
Sick leave and vacation benefits 7,000.00 
Kennecott retirement benefits 12 , 000 . 00 
Subtotal $28,500.00 
"Louise property" 
down payment $4,000.00 
two years' mortgage payments 3,000 . 00 
Subtotal $7,000.00 
Total $35,500.00 
It is appropriate to analyze each of those alleged pre-marital 
monies or assets separately, but subsequent to an analysis of the 
case law relating to pre-marital properties. 
In the case of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
1987), the Court stated that "[t]he appropriate treatment of 
property brought into a marriage by one party may vary from case to 
case." Id. , at 1277. "In appropriate circumstances, one spouse 
may be awarded property which the other spouse brought in to the 
marriage. The rationale behind this exception to the general rule 
is that ' [m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
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whatever source derived.''" Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5-6 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 
824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)) (holding wife's award of husband's pre-
marital property was equitable). I![T]he trial court may, in the 
exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably 
regardless of its source or time of acquisition." Watson, at 6. 
In the case at bar, the trial court exercised its discretion 
properly in awarding Wife the "Kearns" and "Louise" properties. 
Any funds or properties that were pre-marital, lost their identity 
as pre-marital property given the substantial evidence of the 
contribution made by Wife to each of the properties, which 
contributions enhanced and augmented their value. Regardless, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that pre-marital property may be 
treated as marital property in appropriate circumstances. In Burke 
v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1987) (which held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to award husband a 
portion of wife's inheritance), the Court stated: 
"Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be 
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain 
the separate property brought to the marriage. However, 
the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable 
property division, trial courts need consider all of the 
pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be 
considered are the amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired before or 
during the marriage; the source of the property; the 
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health of the parties; the parties' standard of living, 
respective financial conditions, needs, and earning 
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of 
the marriage, the parties' ages at time of marriage and 
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and 
the necessary relationship the property division has with 
the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. 
Of particular concern in a case such as this is whether 
one spouse has made any contribution toward the growth of 
the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the 
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts 
of the parties." 
Burke, at 135. 
It is important to note that the bulk of the assets of the parties 
are made up of the three real properties, the substantial one of 
which was awarded to Husband. The most valuable property, the 
"Grantsville" property, which was unencumbered, was awarded to 
Husband free and clear. The two substantially lesser properties 
were those that were awarded to wife. Certainly, this permits 
Husband to continue enjoying the standard of living that the 
parties enjoyed during the marriage, as he was being awarded the 
marital residence. As the quilting machine, which was the sole 
source of Wife's earned income (Tr., p.157, 11. 1-9), was awarded 
to Husband, Wife's only source of income was the Marcus Knowlden 
note, paid at the rate of $120.00 per month. The court found that 
with the award of the Louise property to Wife, she would receive 
another $325.00 per month rental income, so that she would have a 
total net income of $445.00 per month. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 246.) Once Wife received the 
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alimony award of $400.00 ordered by the court, her total income was 
$845.00. The alimony is taxable income as well as the rental 
income from the property. Husband's $1,200.00 per month income 
from social security and his Kennecott retirement was net income. 
Therefore, while not subject to mathematical precision, it would 
appear that the parties would be in approximately equivalent 
circumstances, so long as Wife receives the rental income, and, as 
long as Wife was not required to make a mortgage payment of any 
substance. The court awarded Wife two properties, both of which 
are relatively humble properties, but one of which she can live in 
to avoid a substantial monthly mortgage payment. It is clear, that 
the award of the properties allowed for an equalization of the 
standard of livings of the parties. 
It is important for this Court to note, as well, the ages of 
the parties. Both parties are in their sixties. The assets 
currently in their possession are likely to be the bulk of what 
they will have at their death. Neither would have a substantial 
prospect of future income or employment. As stated in Newmeyer, 
"[t]he overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be 
equitable - that property be fairly divided between the parties, 
given their contributions during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of the divorce." Newmeyer, at 1278 
(citing Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986)). 
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In a case somewhat similar to the facts of this matter, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court's award of one-half of 
the value of a recreational cabin to the wife was equitable, even 
though the husband, had used a substantial amount of proceeds from 
the sale of pre-marital property to finance the construction of the 
cabin. "The court found that the cabin was constructed during the 
marriage by the parties 'working as a family, and drawing on their 
earnings, the daily funds of all . . .'". Preston v. Preston, 646 
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982). 
Premarital property is similar to the inherited or gifted 
property of one spouse. These different types of properties are 
often treated comparably in divorce actions and are therefore 
analogous. The trial court's broad discretion applies in these 
types of cases as well. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that " [s]ignificantly, no 
case has been found where this Court has reversed a trial court's 
disposition of gifts or inherited property received by one party 
during the marriage. In almost every case, we have emphasized the 
wide discretion trial courts have in property division and have 
refrained from laying down any general rules for the disposition of 
gifts and inherited property." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 
304, 307 (Utah 1988) (holding that the trial court's division of 
property on a percentage basis was proper). 
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In Mortensen, the Court outlined Utah law regarding gifts and 
inheritances as follows: 
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 
'equitable' property division pursuant to section 30-3-5 
should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most 
other jurisdictions and with the division made in many of 
our own cases, generally award property acquire by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or 
property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its 
value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it, (referring to 
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973) . . . or (2) 
the property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the 
other spouse (referring to Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)) . " 
Mortensen at 308. 
As set forth in the facts of the case. Wife, in the case at 
bar, made substantial contributions to the preservation and 
acquisition of the real properties in question. Further, the 
monies that were pre-marital were not readily separable or 
distinguishable as pre-marital and they were commingled with that 
portion that was clearly marital. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court must analyze the 
individual alleged pre-marital contributions for which Husband is 
asking on offset. The Grantsville property was purchased with a 
$2,500.00 down-payment by Husband. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law# f6, Index 253.) However, the land remained 
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completely undeveloped until the parties commenced building on the 
property. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ [6, Index 253.) 
An appraisal was performed on the property prior to trial in order 
to evaluate the marital estate. As part of the appraisal, Husband 
attempted to break out the separate valuation of the land in that 
appraisal, which, using the cost approach as argued by Husband's 
counsel, valued that land at $9,500.00. However, the land is not 
separate from the home and out-buildings that have been constructed 
with the "sweat equity" of both Husband and Wife. The appraised 
value of the property of $86,000.00 was the "market" valuation, 
which includes both the land and the structures on the land. (Tr. , 
p.150, 11. 7-13.) 
Further, the initial $2,500.00 down payment in 1956 is 
certainly too remote and has been overwhelmingly consumed by the 
efforts of Wife in the preservation of the property. As outlined 
in the facts of the case, as to the Grantsville property, the Wife 
testified that in June of 1979, the parties assisted in tearing 
down a 9,000 foot commissary building at Hill Air Force Base to get 
lumber to build their home with. They did that from June through 
October, working practically every day, including Sundays. Wife 
testified that she would drive a two-ton truck and haul materials 
and help gather materials daily. She testified regarding the fact 
that the parties went to several auctions and tore down several 
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buildings to use for materials for the home. (Tr. , p. 11, 11. 1-11.) 
Wife testified that the foundation of the home was put in place in 
1982 and that the parties continued to work every day on the home 
and jointly until 1985 when the home was complete enough to move 
into and when Husband had retired. (Tr., p.11, 11. 11-14.) I n 
addition to the land value, Husband is alleging that he should be 
given credit for two payments received, during the marriage, from 
his employer, Kennecott. First, he testified that in 1981 he 
received a $7,500.00 lump sum payment of his sick leave and 
vacation benefits. However, there is no documentation of that 
allegation, nor has Husband made any attempt to differentiate which 
portion of that was marital and which portion was pre-marital. He 
introduced no testimony from former personnel directors or any 
individuals responsible for the maintenance and distribution of 
those funds. 
Likewise, Husband testified that prior to his retirement, he 
received a lump sum of approximately $12,000.00 that was used for 
a variety of building materials; for which he provided no 
documentation or verification to trial the court tracing how it was 
spent or whether it was spent on other bills or expenses or 
maintenance of the family. (Tr., p.250, 11. 14-15, p. 251, 11. 1-
25.) It is telling that when questioned by Wife's counsel as to 
whether Husband considered the retirement money to be his separate 
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property or separate funds that were being used for the 
"Grantsville property" construction, Husband stated "most of it was 
uh acquired pre-maritally. I don't think I even thought of it one 
way or the other whether it was singly, because Joyce and I were in 
a cooperative effort in building the home." (Tr., p.251, 11. 22-
25.) 
Certainly, the burden is on Husband to provide evidence and 
proof to the court as to which portion, if any, was actual pre-
marital and to provide the court sufficient evidence to find that 
there was not commingling. However, even if the court found that 
the monies were not commingled, Wife's efforts and enhancement of 
the property outweighs Husband's assertions that some portion of 
those funds that were contributed retained their pre-marital 
nature. 
As to the "Louise" property, Husband is requesting an offset 
or credit for a $7,000.00 contribution to that property. However, 
that offset or credit was not requested at the time of trial. At 
the time of trial, Husband testified that he did pay a $4,000.00 
down payment in 1976, but did not testify regarding the amount of 
mortgage payments made up until the date of the parties' marriage. 
(Tr., p.232, 11. 13-25, p. 233, 11. 1-20.) It was the $4,000.00 
down payment, alone, that was raised at the time of trial. 
Husband's failure to raise the request for an additional $3,000.00 
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offset at the time of trial should bar him from requesting that 
relief at this juncture. 
Further, as previously stated, there was substantial monetary 
contribution and "sweat equity" that Wife put into this property as 
well. During the marriage, the mortgage obligation on that 
residence was paid. Further, the court found that there were 
substantial improvements to the property, including siding, new 
carpeting, thermal windows, and a new roof. Further, the court 
found that Wife assisted in scraping and repainting the property, 
cleaning the property for the rentals, making curtains and managing 
the property for rentals. The court specifically found that it was 
a marital asset for purposes of assessing the marital estate and 
dividing the same, due to the acquisition of equity over the period 
of the marriage and the augmentation and enhancement of the 
property by Wife during the marriage and, on a separate basis, 
because of the co-mingling of the marital funds. That property was 
valued at $30,000.00. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Hl3, Index 249.) 
The ultimate goal of property division in divorce matters is 
to make an equitable award. The trial court in this matter, in its 
sound discretion, accomplished that ultimate goal. Based upon the 
facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court's award 
should be affirmed. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE AWARD 
OF ALIMONY. 
The trial court awarded alimony to Wife in the amount of 
$400.00 per month. This amount was based on Husband's earnings of 
$1,500.00 per month, which was based on $1,200.00 actual net 
earnings from social security and retirement and $300.00 per month 
imputed earnings from use of the quilting machine awarded to 
Husband. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 245 
and 246.) The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]limony is to 
be awarded after considering three factors: the receiving spouse's 
financial condition and needs; the receiving spouse's ability to 
earn an adequate income; and the providing spouse's ability to 
provide support." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) 
(citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 Utah 1985)). 
The trial court clearly considered each of these factors in 
awarding $400.00 per month alimony to Wife. First, Wife's 
financial condition is dependent upon the trial court's alimony 
award and property division. Wife has no ability to earn an income 
and therefore cannot meet her monthly expenses without the alimony 
award. Wife's award of the "Kearns" property allows her to reside 
in a home without the responsibility of paying a mortgage (because 
the mortgage was paid in full during the parties marriage) , and 
Wife's award of the Louise property allows her to earn a limited 
income from the rental. However, without the $400.00 alimony award 
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Wife is unable to meet her expenses. Accordingly Wife's financial 
condition and needs demonstrate the propriety of the alimony award. 
Further, as previously set forth in the statement of facts, 
Wife's employment ceased at the time of the marriage for the 
convenience of the marriage. At the time of trial, Wife was 61 
years of age and had been unemployed for sixteen years. 
Accordingly, Wife is unable to provide an adequate income to 
herself without support and assistance from her spouse. 
Husband has the ability to provide the support. Husband earns 
a net income of $1,200 per month from social security and his 
Kennecott retirement. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
1l9, Index 246.) Wife was not awarded any interest in Husband's 
retirement, despite the fact that the retirement is a divisible 
marital asset pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 
1982.) It is undisputed that the parties resided together for a 
period of seven years during Husband's Kennecott employment. 
Further, Husband demanded the award of the quilting machine in 
the property distribution. (Tr., p.p.243, 11. 1-3.) Despite 
Husband's knowledge that his demand for the award of the quilting 
machine would deny Wife's ability to provide an income for herself, 
Husband, nevertheless, persisted. Husband was awarded what he 
asked for. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately imputed the 
$300.00 per month to Husband as money he could earn through the use 
of the machine. 
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"The most important function of alimony is to provide support 
for the [spouse] as nearly as possible at the standard of living 
she [or he] enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the 
[spouse] from becoming a public charge." Willey v. Willey. 866 
P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1075 and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). 
In Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) when 
awarding alimony to the wife, the court took specific notice of the 
fact that during the course of two decades of marriage, the wife 
was employed only episodically, for brief periods, at low-paying 
jobs. Further, the wife did not have an opportunity to build up a 
retirement fund and did not receive interest in the husband's 
pension. Additionally, the husband had better future income 
prospects than did the wife. This case is quite similar to 
Newmeyer. The parties were married sixteen years. Throughout that 
period of time Wife was unemployed. The only income that she had 
was after the separation and through the use of the quilting 
machine, which Husband summarily demanded in the property division. 
Further, Wife did not have an opportunity to build up a retirement 
fund, nor did she receive an interest in Husband's retirement fund. 
Husband has argued that the imputation of $300.00 per month 
from income to be earned from the use of the quilting machine was 
error. However, it was Husband's demands and individual statements 
that required that imputation. As set forth in the statement of 
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facts, when questioned, Husband indicated that he would be earning 
income from the use of the quilting machine. (Tr., p. 244, 11. 7-
11.) 
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the trial 
court imputed income to the husband for purposes of determining 
child support and alimony. Husband appealed, citing insufficient 
findings of fact to support the imputation. The court held that 
because husband had "acquiesced to the imputation of income at the 
trial level" and his job history and current employment supported 
the imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Similarly, Husband "acquiesced" to the imputation of the 
$300.00 per month income from the quilting machine through his acts 
and testimony. 
It is clear that the trial court did not err in imputing an 
additional $300.00 per month to Husband's monthly income and 
determining the alimony award according to that increased amount. 
The trial court's award of $400.00 per month in alimony and 
imputation of income to Husband should be affirmed. 
III. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3(2) provides as follows: 
"in any action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense . . . " 
(emphasis added). 
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This Court has previously held that, pursuant to this statute, 
"either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the adverse 
party to prosecute or defend the action. This includes attorney 
fees incurred on appeal." Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162-
163 (Utah App. 1989). See, also, Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 
(Utah 1978) . Wife is also entitled to costs pursuant to Rule 34 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Inasmuch as Wife has been forced to defend the equitable 
alimony award and property division on appeal, Wife should be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs at the appellate level. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's determination regarding alimony and distribution of real 
property, including that alleged to be pre-marital. Further, it is 
reasonable that this Court award Wife her court costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this M v day of January, 1995. 
CORPOR0N^ fc'WlI&EXAMS, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF Wife were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
to: MANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Husband 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this ' day of , 1995. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. 934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court 
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being 
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant, 
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being 
present in person and being represented by counsel, J. Duke 
Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and 
having presented exhibits and evidence, and the court having 
3RD DISTRICT COURT-TOOELE 
9U-1AR-3 PM3--W 
FILED RY P, 
reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and heard the arguments of 
counsel, and based thereon, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is now and has been for a period or more 
months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this 
action a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah. 
2. That the parties Joyce Knowlden and Grant R. Knowlden are 
husband and wife, having been married on September 10, 1978, in 
Elko County, Nevada, 
3. That the Defendant, Grace Poloskey is a resident of 
Tooele County, State of Utah, and the sister of the Defendant, 
Grant R. Knowlden. 
4. That irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant Knowlden which make continuation of the 
marriage impossible. 
5. That Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have had no 
children born as issue of this marriage and none are expected. 
6. Real property located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, 
Grantsville, Utah, was acquired by Defendant Knowlden prior to the 
marriage. Defendant Knowlden paid $2,500.00 for the land in, 
approximately, 1956, and the land remained undeveloped until the 
parties commenced building upon the property. Plaintiff and 
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Defendant Knowlden commenced building on the property and improving 
the property on or about 1981, and by their labor and "sweat 
equity," built the residence located at that property, which is 
valued at $86,000.00, the current fair market value. The funds of 
money that Defendant Knowlden claims as premarital and which were 
used to assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence 
became co-mingled with marital funds and any monies that may have 
been separate property of Defendant Knowlden lost its separate 
identify because of that co-mingling. Further, the residence was 
constructed with the individual efforts and "sweat equity" of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. This Grantsville property was 
enhanced and augmented by the acts of the Plaintiff and its entire 
value became a marital asset. 
7. That on or about May 13, 1991, Defendant Grant R. 
Knowlden transferred the Grantsville property to his sister, 
Defendant Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration. Since that 
time, the Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have continued to reside 
in the property and treated the property as their own, though the 
property remained in the name of Defendant Knowlden's sister, 
Defendant Poloskey. Defendant Poloskey paid the taxes and 
insurance at various times subsequent to the transfer, but was 
reimbursed those sums by monthly payments made by Defendant 
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Knowlden and or Defendant Knowlden and Plaintiff, which Defendant 
Knowlden sometimes referred to as "rents." 
8. That the Defendant Poloskey testified that she had not 
lost any money out-of-pocket as a result of the transfer of the 
property. Further, Defendant Poloskey testified that she had held 
the real property subsequent to its transfer to protect it for the 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. Defendant Poloskey's conduct is 
consistent with an agency theory, in that she held the property in 
trust for her brother, Defendant Grant R. Knowlden. 
9. That at the time of the transfer of the Grantsville 
property from Defendant Knowlden to Defendant Poloskey, Defendant 
Knowlden had an actual intent to delay, hinder or defraud a 
creditor, in that he testified that he had transferred the property 
because of the threat of a lawsuit by a granddaughter. The fact 
that the Plaintiff's divorce action had not been filed does not 
prevent Plaintiff from claiming a fraudulent transfer pursuant to 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The fact that the transfer 
was made to avoid a lawsuit from a victim in a prior assault, 
rather than to avoid a divorce lawsuit on the part of the Plaintiff 
is irrelevant to the statute. 
10. Under U.C.A. §25-6-5(a) and (b) , the court finds that 
Defendant Grant R. Knowlden fraudulently conveyed the property 
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located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to 
his sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey. 
11. For purposes of dividing the marital estate, the current 
value of the Grantsville property should be used rather than the 
value of the property at the date of its transfer on or about May 
13, 1991, as prayed for by Defendant Knowlden. 
12. The Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided together 
subsequent to their marriage at a home located at 4801 South 4900 
West, Kearns, Utah. That property was purchased by Defendant 
Knowlden prior to the marriage, and in, approximately 1973, but 
transferred into the names of Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden 
subsequent to the parties' marriage. The transfer of said property 
into joint tenancy constituted a gift of the premarital property to 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. Further, during the marriage, 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided at that residence, made 
payments on the mortgage and made improvements on the property, 
including repainting and carpeting. Co-mingling occurred of this 
premarital asset with marital funds. Further there was an 
enhancement of the property by the acts of the Plaintiff. The 
property is a marital asset. The value of that property, at the 
date of trial, is $42,000.00, based upon the appraisal and 
stipulation of the parties. 
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13. Prior to the marriage and in 1976, Defendant Knowlden 
purchased a property located at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. That property remained in his name during the 
marriage. During the marriage, the mortgage was paid. Further, 
during the marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden put siding 
and new carpeting on the property as well as thermal windows and a 
new roof. Further, the marriage, Plaintiff assisted in scraping 
and repainting the property, cleaning the property for the rentals, 
making curtains for the property and managing the property for 
rentals. The property is a marital asset for purposes of assessing 
the marital estate and dividing the same due to the acquisition of 
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and 
enhancement of the property by Plaintiff and the co-mingling of the 
marital funds with the property. The property is valued at 
$30,000.00, pursuant to the evidence presented at trial and the 
testimony of the Plaintiff. 
14. The court finds that the power tools have a value of 
$3,500.00. Plaintiff testified that the power tools and equipment 
were valued at $7,385.00, but that testimony was based an amount 
that was provided to her by another individual which sum she did 
not think was correct and to which she added some things in order 
to come up with that value. Defendant Knowlden valued the tools at 
6 
nnn9 f .* 
approximately $3,500.00 and the court finds that value more 
convincing. 
15. The Plaintiff and Defendant's marital assets, less debts, 
are valued at $162,107.00, and as follows: 
PROPERTY/ASSET VALUE 
Grantsville property $86,000.00 
Kearns property $42,000.00 
Louise property $30,000.00 
Chevrolet Celebrity $1,325.00 
Ford truck $800.00 
Ford mustang $200.00 
Oldsmobile Firenza $975.00 
Chevrolet Citation $100.00 
Chevrolet Cavalier $100.00 
Marcus Knowlden note receivable $7,576.00 
Farm equipment $1,000.00 
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account, 
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah 
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre $1,224.00 
Power Tools and tools $3,500.00 
The above-referenced values are based upon the testimony of the 
parties, stipulation of the parties, appraisals or other evidence 
adduced at trial. 
a. The Plaintiff should be awarded the Kearns property, 
the Firenza, the Cavalier, the Citation, the Marcus Knowlden note, 
the Key Bank Account, Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Credit 
Union and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre. The total of the marital 
estate thus initially awarded to Plaintiff is valued at $51,975.00. 
16. Defendant Knowlden should be awarded the Grantsville 
property, the Celebrity, the Ford truck, the mustang, the power 
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equipment and tools and farm equipment. Further, Defendant 
Knowlden should pay the following debts: as set forth on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, and as follows: Levitz $546.00, Bank One 
$437.00, property taxes (Kearns property $297.00), fire insurance 
(Kearns property 179.00), Utah State taxes $103, and the debt to 
Shellie Eyre $113, which total $1,693.00. 
17. An equal division of the marital estate requires 
Plaintiff to receive, approximately, $81,000.00. To equalize the 
estate, Plaintiff should be awarded the Louise property valued at 
$30,000.00, less the first mortgage. The first mortgage owing to 
Lomas Mortgage should be paid by the Plaintiff and the second 
mortgage owing to Lomas Mortgage should be paid by Defendant 
Knowlden. That division is based upon the representations of 
Defendant Knowlden that the second mortgage is approximately 
$8,245.00, with a monthly payment of $249.72 and that the first 
mortgage is approximately $3,086.00, with a monthly payment of 
$97.00. The total award to Plaintiff of marital property is 
approximately $79,000.00, which is approximately one-half of the 
estate and provides Defendant Knowlden some credit for the original 
down payment made on the Grantsville property. 
18. It is reasonable that the building materials located at 
the Grantsville property be sold and that Defendant Knowlden insure 
that those be sold and that Defendant Knowlden obtain two estimates 
8 
00024V 
from two different appraisers as to what they think the property 
can sell for and sell the building materials to the highest bidder. 
The money received should then be divided equally between the 
parties, one-half to each. 
19. Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is retired and has total net 
income of $1,200.00, which includes social security and his 
Kennecott Retirement income, less the deduction for the survivor 
benefit which he pays each month for the benefit of the Plaintiff. 
In addition, Defendant Knowlden has the ability to earn an 
additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he is being awarded 
the quilting machine, which he requested and which should be 
awarded to him. Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00 
per month from the use of that machine and has been earning that 
sum during the pendency of this action. The Plaintiff will no 
longer have that money available to her, but Defendant Knowlden 
should have that money available to him to add to his monthly net 
income. The Plaintiff's monthly income is comprised of $120.00 per 
month which she receives from Defendant Knowlden's son, Marcus 
Knowlden, which is a note receivable owed to her. Further, with 
the award of the Louise property to her, Plaintiff will receive the 
sum of approximately $325.00 per month, for a total net income of 
$445.00 per month. Based upon the respective incomes of the 
parties, it is reasonable that Defendant Knowlden pay Plaintiff 
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permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month. That sum does 
not equalize the parties' income. The court questions whether 
Defendant Knowlden will, in fact, make use of the quilting machine 
and it is anticipated that in the near future, Plaintiff will 
qualify for social security benefits. Four hundred dollars per 
month is reasonable based upon Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay 
and the Plaintiff's needs. The Plaintiff's monthly expenses are 
minimally $879.00 per month, without a mortgage or rent payment. 
The Plaintiff will have $448.00 net per month and the Kearns 
property which will provide her with a place to live, rent free. 
The $400.00 is within Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay and, 
clearly, the Plaintiff needs that amount in order to survive. 
20. Defendant Grace Poloskey testified that she is holding 
approximately $7,000.00, representing fire insurance proceeds paid 
to her as the title holder to the Grantsville property. The court 
does not have authority to re-claim those assets as Defendant 
Poloskey had a contract with the insurance company and the court 
does not have authority to retrieve those sums. 
21. That the personal property acquired by the parties should 
be divided according to Exhibit 10, attached hereto, designated as 
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, expect for the 
disputed items set forth on Exhibit 10b, which should be divided as 
follows: 
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TO THE PLAINTIFF: Small tables, candelabra and clock, washer 
and dryer to Plaintiff, the screw gun, refrigerator in the 
pantry, the dresser lamp, the large mixer, the sander, one-
half of the knives and the Kirby vacuum. 
TO DEFENDANT: Large tables, antique chair, the luggage, 
refrigerator in kitchen, the pattern cabinets, the stained 
glass grinder to the Defendant, one-half of the knives, and 
the other vacuum. 
22. That Defendant Knowlden should insure that the second 
mortgage obligation on the Louise property be removed from that 
property. 
23. Defendant Knowlden should be awarded the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance policy. 
24. Based upon the award of alimony, Defendant Knowlden 
should be awarded all right, title and interest in his Kennecott 
retirement. 
25. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees and 
costs, as, with the division of the property and the award of 
alimony, neither party is in a better position or better able to 
carry that financial burden. 
26. Defendant Grant R. Knowlden should be enjoined and 
restrained from coming around the Plaintiff at her residence or 
from telephoning Plaintiff or having any contact with Plaintiff 
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whatsoever. Further, Defendant Knowlden should be enjoined from 
harassing, annoying or physically touching or abusing Plaintiff. 
27. Plaintiff should remove herself from the Grantsville 
property no later than March 31, 1994. Until the Plaintiff removes 
herself from the Grantsville property, Defendant Knowlden will be 
permitted access to the property, but only for the limited purposes 
of the construction of the firewall pursuant to the earlier court 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion in Re: Contempt. 
28. Defendant Knowlden should cooperate with Plaintiff in 
providing Plaintiff with any and all documents necessary to obtain 
information regarding the rental of the Kearns property, including 
lease documents. 
29. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver any 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this 
action. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties of this 
action and the subject matter of this action. 
2. That a Decree of Divorce should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff on the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
12 
000246 
become final immediately upon being signed by the Court and entered 
by the Clerk. 
3. That said Decree of Divorce should be in conformance with 
the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this 2L- day of sMc 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
., 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
A-y 
TT-, WILLIAM'A. THORNE 
District Court Judge 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden 
DATED: / vi Q^ s 
J. DUKE 
Counsel 
Dated: 
EDWARDS 
for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused 
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT to be served upon Defendants by 
causing a true and correct copy of the same to be hand-delivered 
to: 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
J. Duke Edwards 
Attorney for Defendant Poloskey 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
M day of <6V3f[XIL\^j , 1994 • 
A&^/rw? 
Secretary 
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Notes for Mary Joyce N H L L S - I 
i Jan 1980 
SEWING ROOM K ' / 
and Notions Aid^e a k4JJ£tsij4<xigi^iSf ' L a c e s ' 
/ C u l t o n P a t L j n q ' ~ ^UJO bfiXT* 
<U^feoa%-~Cais.efH and S h e l v e s «. -
</6urtj^fcHLx\q ,^Mac h i nfe 
^ r n m a S e w i n g M a c h i n e ' 
u?fe'eFnette g e r g e r ^ 
/ U c r r n i n a ' l n d u s t r i a l S e w i n g M a c h i n e . ' ujfc % 
p a t t e r n C a b i n e t s " and J ? a t t e r n s J ^ - £ £ f ^ ' ^ ^ J 
> B a o k s a n d M a g a z i n e ^ ^
 0 
y G u i l t " P a t t e r n s e t c . CA*JU u ^ k I W ^ V ° | J 1 
{/Small Paper Cutter 
^ R o l l e r I r o n e r ; 
^5M O v e r h e a d P r o j e c t o r , 
/ H o m e s t e a d Hand Q u i l t i n g F r4n ie 
2 50 Ga_l A c g u a n u m s P / ^ i 
2 F f a f f T 3 0 ^ e w i n g M a c h i n e s Una*-«***-• 
C h a i r s t o o l d D i n i n g Room S4?t 
yLatge F a p e r C u t t e r 
^ 
G r e a t Room 
^TV a n d VCR 
2, Fc C o u c h S e t .
 ( . " / j Z ^ " N 
2* T u r q u o i s j * R e c l i n e r s V K) jgb£sMQ~ *~% 
i Wood C o f f e e T a b l e s ^ ^ ~"~~ 
/ R o u n d G l a s s ^ T o p C o f f e e T a b l e 
K/
 1 l a r g e O v a l TabJ^e F o r m i c a T o p /§JU~U- h^u UOMJAH^ <**-, .J0D£rfcf 
U ^ S m a l l Round Ta l ^JLes^w i th F o r m i q a ^ T o p s / <^u ( ^ ^ n u . 0 / ^ e 
VC A n t i q u e C h a i r s r ¥ c i n 1 1 y ' T e c o v e r e d 
l o w . L a m p / 
Dining Room Table & 
Or l e n l T a l Rujjg 
Ex^ass l i t e m s ' i n B u f f e £ 
C h a i r s w i t h M a t c h i n g B u f f e t H» 
Z*S2\ 
^ j r i Y e r p l a t e d i t e m s i n p u i v f e t 
^ a s e b & W h a t n o t s a n d j i c ^ n ^ B u f . f p V O k * ^ t^*4** 
^ v £ * - ftou 
^ 6 / t e n O c c a s i o n a l C h a i r ^xMy^ CM^* 
> / S m a l l VCR C a b i n e t 
/ C h a i r a t P i a n p 
v ? Z ^ G r e e n / w h i t e F l o w e r j A r r n g e m e n t 
l / L a r g e F l o w e r A r r a n g e m e n t 
s / L a r g e ^ ^ ^ L F l o w e r _Ar£ang«inen t Gr 
^ S e t ' C a n d e T a b r a & cf lact f *~ 
> / C h r i s t u s . S t a t u e 
^ P w l U m b r e l l a S t a n d 
L : r g e 2 Way Bool ; c a s e 
^C^Btlcn T a b l e w i t o w e r ^ A r r a n g e m e n t 
- ( T i r b y Vacuum C l e a n e r '} yrjkliiju ^[x&Qg 
> R o u n d T r a m p o l i n e J o g g e r 
C u r t a i n s a H d _ D r a p e s 
Notes tor Mary Joyce HALLS-1 
1 JCAI. 198U F, 
MASTER BEDROOM 
S a t e l l i t e " s y s t e T - aZ*-VX<4~ ±* tf£) rL,6rrJ&& 
^ o v e b e a t 
•6 ,Iand Bedroom S e t — <Luxw*>L*>^  
/Qr i ien ta l^&Ujg U^C-
(Tedar CTfg^t^^ 
< 2 ^ i - g ^ p s ^ x t h o u t s h a d e s 
IT f\ 
^ n t i q u e S t e r « a i 
^2 C u r i a C a b i n e t s w i t h A n t i q u e ^ / t e m s 
^ D r e s s e r ^ L a m p A\ i r A £ 
^=^m^r^iM • * * , ; ^ ^ - \ « « . ~ , b ^ 
/ J e w e l r y B o x e s — m * i / * ^ * cr*£**« ^ ^ n i T o H , 
^5 P l l l O W S ^ "" L+* UAJGA Lnth+t^J-
/ C u i f t a i n s ^ n d ^ D r a p e s CM^Lrv* f** ("**>-([*" *+**¥ 
^^s^T^B^th ' c i a t he s~ "Hamper 
F i l c h e n 3 Basan^S i lnP h L h l e r ^ 
Wood b u r n i n g S t o v ^ 
^ b r a s ^ t o w e l r a c t s * n d t i s s u e d i s p e n s e r - tf^A^UjL fo N****^ 
^ a h ^ " " " ^ 7 r a f ted~~by me : o p a l n e c k l a c e o r ^ s i I v e r ^ c h a m ^ ( ( p i s s i n g ) 
/ P e a r l & D iamond r i n g ( m i s s i n g ) 
/l s i l v e r r o p e c h a i n necl- l a c e s ( m i s s i n g ) 
/ H a n d c r a f t e d o p a l n e c k l a c e s for— J a c k - ( m i s s i n g ) 
BLACh BEDROOM 
2 Cf utrn Lamps 
Stci- t^o C a b i n e t 
B „ Lr cv Dr e ^ s e i 
/ B F ^ ^ ^ i F T ^ n p a r a g e ) 
^ f e t t r e s s ~]^ <" BQ_X^^S p r I n g s (_ir\. g a r a g e ) 
2 N i g h t ~ S t a n d s ( i n Garage}) 
^ / W ^ e r ^ g g c L ^ F r a m e ( i n G a r a g e ) - ^ 
P i l l o w s ( 6 ) 
pl!A«l*fca«atef riOmJBamtji) 
^SSTSSpr J J jS B a g a ^ U « V ) c » e n , ^ - l , f e a t h e r y 
White t n ^ k g t j ^ 
C l o c K a n d R a d i o 
VCR R e c o r d e d Tapes 
CLtr t a i n s , D r a p e s ' and m a t c h i n g B e d s p r e a ^ l 
N
' Sn iow h G o l d Lamp w i t h o u t S h a d e 
Se f lT i r r re l C e r a m i c CXiTB'yr^Q'h't^aTn^ei-
/ I SmcalJ. B r a s s r o u n d box w i t h l i d 
^ 4 l £ E J r T ^ q u © - F l o w e r - ^ M ^ e ' 
2 &i a s s W a l l S c o r f c e ^ 
C h e r r y wood -Bed f r a m e 
GREEN BEDROOM 
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1 Jc*n 19B0 
bole Springs and Mattress. r'M 
Bedroom Set ;*(Gr.an ts ) yri^ 
PfETOTre "v 
Type iVr "Tter^ ^ 
v / S , t a m e d Uala 'ss* G r i n d e A 4i l j [4 i6 
L /B iu^~~Bonne t P a i n t i n g 
^ H a n g i n g Lamp 
P i n k
 ? G r e e n & Y e l l o w B e d s p r e a d 
l iray** B l u e BecTs^pT^eaq^ 
e a c o c k T a p e s t r y 
VvCR T a p e C o v e r s 
/ S c h o o l Desk 
B o i t ^ o f G r a n t s S u i t s 
2 ' F i l l o w f 
C u r t a i n s and D r a p e s . 
/ U n f i n i s h e d ^ r e d / b l a c k / g r e e f ^ D u i l t 
U n f i n i s h e d S p i n n i n g S p o o l s . j Q u i l t 
L o n e ^ S t a r ^ Q u i l t ^ 
^ ' F u s c i a & B l a c k Q u i l t ^ 
}
^^^$rj)S!L* S1 e e p i n Q&Bjlb 
Gi a \ B l u e Qu i 1 t 
Whi t e S l a n t e I: 
ht_d E l t f C - t r i c B l a n t e t 
f h_-xl-l S l e e p i n g bag 
SMALL BATHROOM 
P i n t Hamper, C > > ^ 7 ^ H ^ ^ ^ 
/ S h e l l Soap D i s h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ C^^^T0^ 
/ B . - i t h A r t i c l e s * AUUiw tUfth>+~ d*"™** &+-' 
/ M e d i c i n e s ' ' ^ / 
<•' G o l d W a s t e P a p e r Bas i e t 
U T I L I T Y ROOM ( c u r r e n t k i t c h e n ) 
/ M i c r o Wave -, *> A^  
L a r g e J a a s t ^ r ^ """ rXL' 
.^c <L 
\ / 3 m a l l T o a s t e r aZ>4HL££aW: 
/ C a n QpefTer_( i n s t a l l e d b e l o w c a b i n e t : ) , 
y/j»Ash^r «/7 D r y e r > \ (Wwt^vw"U>WtiV t v ^ f e ^ t ^ ^ / ^ c < i 
v / t ^ t o v e ^ 
" / D r a f t i n g T a b l e 
/ T o a s t e r Oven (Xmas^ p r e s e n t ) 
/l^Lt&^.M4tfS?7 S ^ \ ^ 
/ F o t s «6LEftOJ?y ^v W - . . . 
/
h o t s & P a n s n m g a r a g e ) j v e^OV-^  
S t o n e w a r e D i s h e s 
i J o F i t a l - e "l2..PJ.ac'e? !ST,e*ETing D i s h e s 
0 t h e r ~ S T 1 v e r w a r e t ^ C P - * ^ » ^ * 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 
Notes f o r l i a r y Joyce HALLS-1 
1 Jan 1980 
/ b o l d *~Si lv ierwara 
„f,sy%~ Unives & - C o o k i n g - U t e n s i l s jfSA 0Wl$ 
LJann^ngTKe111 ea ( 1 e a c h l t / 
'Whelf t G r i n d ! r 
2 uicer aerving Bowls Refrigerator 
SoTaT-Hhleating Unit £ 
/ NEW b ITCHEN 
/ 
Booth Table? 
^ White WicPer Chairs 
"*f WhTt^Tt^^T^~^CRaTi rs
 4 . . .^  
/Rfefi igerator - «L.IY^ *i
 a|M««A»^^l*j^^ 
/Freezer H' /<*-<^ u*- ^ t-U^ v H^ b-***~*rfi * ^^ 
2 Plastic Water Containers I ^ >^ / 
2. Back Packs in pantry^ / \ y 
Glasses im pantry xl^ 
Portable 5" TV j< Radio, 
L^ cH^ ge 2 "side Bool' case^ 
/Corner Divider for Bootcase^ 
^BTacTC Greeting Card Cabinet 
OLD SEWING ROOM 
r Computer & P r i n t e r 
2^£rrtTiaque g reen Lamps w i t h o u t shades i 
/ T o o l s & BQTTSing T laT te r i a l sh 
rRecords ( B e t t y ; s ) 
O the r Records •*• £ T fcv^L^pt * *- p £ * W 
/ B O O ^ C ^  t ^ ^ V ^ 
A 2 H a l f C i r c l e ^ T a b l ^ s w ^ •& f k 
^Manual Wheat G r i h d e r 
J T y p e w r i t e r ^>^fCLu/i-» 
/ F i l i n g C a b i n e t ( M e t a l ) 
/ e u i t a r ( g i f t ) ' ^ 0 ") 
^y/Small R e v o l v i n g Fan
 r ( has s i n c e d i s a p p e a r e d ) w \:x£w^-^*-=n~v^c t ; 
/,5 Ga'I^"Heavy \(\ 1 urninum~~Ffot 
j ^aY fn tng J u i c e r 
Fneumat i cT 'A i r Wrench , 
Camera vEqu3pfnent" (Granfts) 
Skil-~Saw . i i 
J
 ^ M ^ ^ ^ i S S ^ r j J ^ ^ f ^ ****** ^ M r -
b o V j t c f l lJ^pij-Qlc^ Elec". Boxes 
ggffgfrCT^gqgrsL n n ft p '•'? / 
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1 Jdii 1980 Pc 
Hand Had- Saw 
^luetic Drill 
£UJ: of Elec Drill Bits 
Electric Staple Gun 
F ipe Wr ei ich 
1 /4 u f w»utt boic 16 p n a i l s ( g a l v . ) 
B lau l - >i W h i l e P a i n t i n g 
Ch i I d S c h o o l Ded< 
F d h j j O i u c A u d i o F l a y e r 
T i l > S n i JJ-5 
Set uf Handy Man Set Encyclopedias 
Sheet "Roct Tape_Gui$i 
%bun 'o f" JB 'Tracl' Tape^ 
Old Cassette & 'Recorder^Playqf 
hland Planer 
Large"Hand Plane 
I 'Square ^ 
v'UHF/VHF Converter Model UVC 
^Gibralter Amplifler 
/Fresz-D-Tectar 
Yellow ..Handle Hand Sart 
r» Cal Flat finish Sealer 
1 Gal Late;; Satin Enamel (5 gal. bucket) 
GE Solid State Stereo (Doesnt work) 
L_Qt U^QUid S e v m 
rh Staaned Glass Lamp Shade 
'/Pencil Sharpener 
i*l 
A 
STORAGE SHED 
Boa t JP/A/V... 3 
b ^ t > Q a q ^ M p . t d r ^ l j ^ 4 
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I L r e s 
- ' Lumber (mo 
Car Engines 
Ccu i ranaini ssi an 
B e e s uf nails 
NeLal, Locter fiJLled with electrical paraphanel Ja 
Lhain^Bloc^ idsP^^'i 
i;6or s / 
lAd Fire Ha^es 
l/hetal Ornamental Railings from Old Elevators 
Ceramic Molds V**40^mi^/ 
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STORGE SFACE UNDER BEDROOM WING 
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/(one^dimes, ;buffaio jiic^ els^fr^Wheat pennies) 
v/9~ 5 aal containers ^ food storage 'wheat iL ^LU 
^6* 
f o o  o r a g  w t 1 / > f t l / "V-  g l c o n t a i e r s 
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He* taT l , : "d ra i r r p i p ^ * 
r.ttZJ.. 
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Tcilets 
jpri-g^t^ 
Urate Satellite Receiver 
f^^^eF^T~S~TtT^t 5 Aid Cabinets (approic.) 
Rugs^ 
W a t e r S o f t e n i n g A p p l i a n c e ( j r f i M ^ ? 
Mui r ieroL i j o t h e r i t e m s b u r i e d t o o d e e p t o s e e 
SHACh 
/ .. 
bo ; : s p r i n g s 
L U / . O J o f F r u i t £ P r e s e r v e s 
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T L I I J O u t 13eu ^ ^ . U — -
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P U s T i c F l u m b i n g P i p e s 
Eo;; o r I n t e r c o m W i r e 
& 
i 
 r 
Audio SpeaP ers 
eed Spreader 
£'orta Potty 
,
ileed <* Branch Shredder 
14 Cans 1/2 pint Varnish 
Metal Loci-ers filled with chemicals, ,f lawer^ plan t oowders, 
lawn sprmi- reF**sr"r*boal' s*^ etc . 
Wood Shelves 
Liutal Shelves b Uprights 
/p Gal Containers 
/buLide TV Antennas 
/wood Mouldings 
/ycunbird Sprinl' ler (pop up etc. js 
/Drafting Table 
SoTTcf^QaJ^.baTQnlster (Paid $30£>) 
Electric Wirei 
/WJ nd-ows 
/Shelves 
/Ci utches 
^'Sears Table Saw 
/£-u,,es 5' Boxes of Misc Auction Paraphernalia 
/Wood Hitchen Cabinets 
;Chairs to be reupholstered 
r u g s 
O l d S t e r e o s 00023; o 
Notes for Mary Joyce HALLS-1 
1 Jan 1980 
Doors S Door Molding 
Shelves full of Building Materials 
-^"*DFa\ger * M* ta 1 Ch^s t f ul^l^^fjjnuts ^^bjo 1 ts^ ^ screws ;:iji?l &c'J* 'fittings ^  
'7*fctfa:£s^r^y^—e tc / ~ " ~~" 
vUasninq Machine 
^Old Pro Sat Satellite Receiver 
Coin p r e~sfso<r\ 
x/y^S^^Btr B que 
l/bo;; Full of Welding Rods 
\iceramic Kiln 
N/Numorous Heating * air conditioning units taken out of Old Motel 
Metal Awnings 
Garden Hoses . 
v/uabjnet full of Garden' ChemicaTls* I^L 
boxes of Metal Pipe fitting^ 
Sheets of limitation Marble 
Luxes of misc. building materials 
Old 1 lid' o Wave 
Sac! 5 o f Cement 
u m m u m Chaise Lounqe 
\Zpox of set of canisters in Jreenware 
^Mantle Clod' with domed glasss cov^r (present from Linda & Pat) -fHlteJtH 
Furnace (outside of basement door) 
VEHICLES 
1986 Chevrolet Celebrity^ 
v/1985 Oldsmobile "Fireni-a 
</l984 Citation 
Mustang. 
Ford True I' A 
Blue Station Wagon $ 
Yellow Truck - ££% Lty^ ~k $<> A*C 
FARM EQUIPMENT 
Red Tractor (From Parleyj) v ^ ? ^ 
2 John Deere Tractors 
Attachments for tractors 
Plow, Leveler etc.^ 
TOOLS IN OLD SEWING ROOM 
Hack Saw^ 
tA Gc."l " B u c k e t 1 1 / 1 " f i n i s h n a i l s 
1 / 1 o f 2 l b c o f f e e can s c r e w gun s c r e w s 
i g a l b u c k e t o f f i n i s h n = i i l s 
1 /2 g a l w a l l p a p e r s i z i n g 
hodal* s i g n e t : 35 mm Camera i n f i e J d c a s e 
I o d ^ K o t a r y F l a s h H o l d e r w / m i s c . s u p p l i e s 
Mop bucl- e t w/ s t j u e s z e r o l l e r s 
S e a r ' s " C r a f t ^ma 'n73 n s r Be l"t~ S a n a e r ^ a n i ^ J ""Bel p.s 
^5V"i 1 "Z^P 1 'an e*' *H eVv y 'HjiTE^fofj l^^%" 
10 U_oc I* s" ( i n box )*~~ 
_
 M
 Ei crisis S c r e w s 
1 1 / 2 F i n i s h n a i l s 0 
J a n 1980 
m o l i n g N a i l s 
' l a r t 1/4 D r i l l Dbl i n s u l a t e d 
- a n y e 1 0 0 ' e l e c . e x t e n s i o n c o r d 
m y l c a s e w / 2 3 8 t r a c t - t a p e s 
s a r s C r a f t s m a n 1 / 2 " S a b r e Saw 
lacl- * D e c l e r 78 D r i l l 1/3 HP 
7 s h e e t s fine s a n d p a p e r 
/ 2 o f 5 l b - bag i r o n C h e l a t e 138FE 
/^Jjkach P l a y e r w i t h S peat erf 
v
" h G 5 8 RF C a b l e (Coa:c i a l " c a b l e WPL259 C o n n e c t o r s ) 
a i n h R o l l e r w i t h r o l l e r 
11
 R o o f J a c l » e t 
l s c o P d b - 2 6 - 2 / 0 - 2 Power d i s t B l o c l - ( 3 5 0 a m p . 6 0 0 V o l t s ) 3 p o l e b l o c k 
5 n h i ? e t s f i n e s a n d p a p e r ( H 2 8 0 ) 
i i ' J ou r L i g h t c o n t r a J 
a - ^ U j G i n t s 
00 Watt Ebo Jaeger Ac guar l urn ^Heaterg 
LSC:/ "acquanum Supplied 
uovoi- uacuum Clnr Bags Type C 
;*pandable dryer- vent hose 
old Bathroom Fi:; Lures 
(shower, towel, towel brackets, w drawer pulls) 
adjo ShacP Telephone 
ears Craftsman Orbital Dual Motion Sander (Model 315M690) 40 amps. 
l^ cl- o Dec! er Finishing Sander 17404 
ubiich hlec Staple bun (Model T-5-8) 
•ayton Elec. Welder (Med. 2503TD) 
overb Cu Pipe Gi lp (=»mall) 
/8 Craftsman Scroller Saw (Mod.315-10721/ 
• lac I .? Deeper Jig Saw (7504-type 5) 
lilwaul-eo Elec 7 1/4 Circular Saw i 
(Heavy duty, worm drive (cat. tl-6377) 
iammer . 
/ tudsensgr 
:patul3 
it ^ s =i Shears 
arge Tin Snips 
.4" Pipe Master'Pipe U'renchtf 
." Long Flam^^y^^^f^U-) 
)rill lnde:c / ( 
.arge Allen Wrench 
/' wide half circle spatula 
"uller 9/16 Crescent Wrench 
lriannle Allen Wrench 
I Square with Bubble level 
iiin - T iri S h e a r s 
•5t i . in ley "* Way J e v e l 
• J u t l a n d W i t h e r b y P l a n e 
J p a t 111 -i -J 
1 »"> K v i L O G r i p 
D h e e t Reel ' Saw 
1 0 0 ' Round m e a s . t a p e ( s t a r t s a t 8 ) 
Haci' Saw 
I r w i n S p e e d b o s e t o f 6 n 8 8 " e l e c d r i l l wood b i t s 
f J i r e C u t t e r s i z e 1 0 - 2 2 
Small 1 1/2 s p a t u l a Q Q 0 2 3 t J 
Notes far Mary Joyce HALLb -1 
1 Jar) 1980 
rod RuTler Wallpaper Tool 
~rt t^re^'up c \ 
25' Meal,. Tape 
10' M(>as. Tape 
~Fi~reT Pressure Gauge 
2 Spool.s Soldering 
DuLuh Pay Rosin Core Wire Solder 
tira'ftsman Set Punc1^ 
2 wood Chisel 
2 All en Wrenches 
Flal *=crew drivers- 4 large, 1 stubby, 4 small 
Mule Punch 
2 Glas<.> Cutters 
2 Utility 1 nives 
3 Wire Cutlers 
Flat head Pliers 
J Plii*r 
1 large wire cutler £• Fliers 
7 20 amp. far fuse b„>,:es 
4 Phillip Screw Drivers 
Lang"" fangs 
Large Square 
^ Sheet Rock T Square 
TOOLS ALREADY GIVEN TO GRANT 
-'rotr^ctor 
o'ed Wormwood Sw 
Plumbing Snap e 
Blaci- & Deeper Scrol Saw 
Small Nail Puller-
Lung Trowel 
Roller £' cover 
F j |jt- Wrench 
Laige Pipe Wrench 
F1Lsrs 
Screw Drivers - 4 bla-le. 2 Phillips 
Vice Grips 
HciC.I' Saw 
Spatulas - large & small 
25' Measuring Tape 
C^r pe c h u f e 
Glass Cutter-
Wire Cutlers 
Hand Flane 
Wirt* Cutters large 
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APPENDIX "B 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. 934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court 
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being 
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant, 
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being 
present in person and being represented by counsel, J. Duke 
Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and 
having presented exhibits and evidence, and the court having 
reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and heard the arguments of 
counsel, and the court having previously entered its Findings of 
3RD DISTRICT COUR["-TOOELE 
91* MAR-8 PH3 ' l i 8 
FILED BY fy 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and based thereon and good cause 
appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, the same to become final immediately. 
2. Based upon the court's finding that under U.C.A. §25-6-
5(a) and (b) , that Defendant Grant R. Knowlden fraudulently 
conveyed the Plaintiff's and Defendant Knowlden's marital residence 
at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to his 
sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey, the court includes that property 
in the marital estate for purposes of valuing the estate and that 
asset. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's Knowlden's home and real property located at 6000 North 
Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah. Plaintiff is hereby 
awarded Plaintiff's and Defendant Knowlden's home and real property 
located at 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah, and the Plaintiff's 
and Defendant Knowlden's residence and real property located at 39 
East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Each party is ordered to 
execute and deliver any necessary documents to transfer the title 
and ownership of the real property of the Plaintiff and Defendant 
Knowlden as set forth above. Defendant Knowlden is ordered to pay 
the Lomas Mortgage Company, representing the current second 
mortgage on the Louise property. Further, Defendant Knowlden is 
ordered to transfer that mortgage from the Louise property so that 
property is no longer encumbered by that second mortgage. 
0002*5^ 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay the first mortgage owing to Lomas 
Mortgage Company, which is currently an encumbrance on the Louise 
property. 
3. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Firenza, the Cavalier, 
and the Citation automobiles. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded 
the Celebrity automobile, the Ford truck and the Ford mustang. 
4. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded her accounts at Key Bank, 
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Central Credit Union, the Marcus 
Knowlden note receivable and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre. The 
Defendant Knowlden is awarded the money accounts in his name. 
5. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded power equipment and 
tools and farm equipment. 
6. Defendant Knowlden is hereby ordered to pay the debts 
owing to Levitz, Bank One, property taxes for the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's properties, fire insurance owing on the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's properties, Utah State taxes owing by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant and the debt to Shellie Eyre, which debts are in the 
approximate total of $1,693.00. 
7. The Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to sell the 
building materials located at the Grantsville property. Defendant 
Knowlden is ordered obtain two estimates from two separate as to 
the value of the property and arrange for the sale of those 
building materials to the highest bidder. Plaintiff and Defendant 
Knowlden are each awarded one-half of the proceeds. 
3 0002t 
8. Defendant Knowlden is hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff 
permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month. 
9. The personal property of the Plaintiff and Defendant 
Knowlden shall be divided as set forth on Defendant Knowlden's 
Exhibit 10, except for the disputed items which are to be awarded 
as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: Small tables, candelabra and clock, washer 
and dryer to Plaintiff, the screw gun, refrigerator in the 
pantry, the dresser lamp, the large mixer, the sander, one-
half of the knives and the Kirby vacuum. 
TO THE DEFENDANT: Large tables, antique chair, the luggage, 
refrigerator in kitchen, the pattern cabinets, the stained 
glass grinder, one-half of the knives, and the vacuum. 
10. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance policy. 
11. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded all right, title and 
interest in his Kennecott retirement. 
12. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs incurred. 
13. Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is hereby permanently 
enjoined and restrained from coming around the Plaintiff at her 
residence, from telephoning Plaintiff, or having any contact with 
Plaintiff whatsoever. Further, Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is 
hereby permanently enjoined from harassing, annoying or physically 
touching or abusing Plaintiff. 
4
 00023/ 
14. Plaintiff is ordered to remove herself from the 
Grantsville property no later than March 31, 1994. Until the 
Plaintiff removes herself from the Grantsville property, Defendant 
Knowlden shall be permitted access to the property for the limited 
purposes of the construction of the firewall pursuant to the 
earlier court Order on Plaintiffs Motion in Re: Contempt. 
15. Defendant Knowlden is ordered to cooperate with Plaintiff 
in providing Plaintiff with any and all documents necessary to 
obtain information regarding the rental of the Kearns property, 
including lease documents. 
16. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver 'all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this 
action. 
DATED this j2_ day of slcz^^C__
 f 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
WILLIARA. THORNE 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden 
DATED: o o / o^^^ 
U^^A^T 
J. DUKE EDWARDS 
Counsel for Defendant 
Dated: 
OOOdiio 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused 
the attached DECREE OF DIVORCE to be served upon Defendants by 
causing a true and correct copy of the same to be hand-delivered 
to: 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
J. Duke Edwards 
Attorney for Defendant Poloskey 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid 
)n, in the United States mail at Sail 
day of -efyEfTi'foi*/ , 1994, 
thereo lt Lake City, Utah on the 
Oh v  M 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX "C" 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #349 3 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL AND PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RELIEF 
vs. 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. 934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. Judge William Thorne 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above entitled court on May 3, 1994, at the hour 
of 10:30 a.m., the Honorable William Thorne, Third District Court 
Judge presiding, on Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Plaintiff's Response and Motion for Relief, and the Plaintiff being 
present in person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F. 
Williams, and the Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present and 
being represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having 
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the files and 
I' 
9f-4 HAY I7X1!0-.1»5 
FILED BY- t 
ooosio 
memorandum contained therein, based thereon and for good cause 
appearing, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
2. Defendant is ordered to execute two quit claim deeds, 
quit claiming the Louise Avenue and Kearns properties to Plaintiff. 
Defendant refused to do so in open court and the court, therefore, 
grants the Clerk of the Court, in and for Tooele County, State of 
Utah, the authority to execute both quit claim deeds on behalf of 
and in the stead of Grant R. Knowlden, and directs that the clerk 
so execute those deeds, which are described as follows: 
a. Lot 17 & 18, Block 1, JOHNSON STATE STREET 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in the records of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, 
commonly known as 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and; 
b. Lot 208 HOFFMAN HEIGHTS #6 SUBDIVISION, according 
to the official plat thereof, recorded in the 
records of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
commonly known as 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah. 
3. That should the Defendant not transfer the second 
mortgage on the Louise property within two weeks, that issue may be 
brought back before the court. 
4. That the issue raised by Plaintiff relating to the 
building materials is reserved. 
2 
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5. That Plaintiff's counsel is to direct letters to the 
tenants in the two properties and provide to them a copy of the 
Decree, instructing them to make payments henceforth directly to 
Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Arabian Gelding acquired 
by the parties during their marriage and the associated debt owing 
to James Faris. 
7. Each party is to pay his or her own attorney's fees. 
DATED this r r day of ^ 1994. 
r^Psf 
WILLIAM/^HORNE 
District Court Judge 
00031. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused 
the attached ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION to be served upon 
Defendants by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Attorney for Defendant 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
J. Duke Edwards 
Attorney at Law 
4685 South Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
_ J j _ day of J '•,"i.. , 1994. 
Secretary 
00031,) 
